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Abstract
This paper considers price competition in a duopoly with quality uncertainty. The es-
tablished firm (the ‘incumbent’) offers a quality that is publicly known; the other firm
(the ‘entrant’) offers a new good whose quality is not known by some consumers. The in-
cumbent is fully informed about the entrant’s quality. This leads to price signalling rivalry
because the incumbent gains and the entrant loses if observed prices make the uninformed
consumers more pessimistic about the entrant’s quality. When the uninformed consumers’
beliefs satisfy the ‘intuitive criterion’ and the ‘unprejudiced belief refinement’, prices sig-
nal the entrant’s quality only in a two–sided separating equilibrium and are identical to
the full information outcome.
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1 Introduction
It is well established that in markets with asymmetric information firms may use prices, pos-
sibly in conjunction with additional marketing devices, to signal quality information to un-
informed market participants. In particular, if only some fraction of consumers is informed
about quality, then firms may signal their qualities to the uninformed by setting prices higher
than under perfect information. The idea is that high-quality firms suffer less from decreased
sales to informed consumers due to price increases than low-quality firms. Therefore a high-
quality firm can separate itself by setting a high price which is not profitable to imitate for the
low-quality firm. Signalling thus leads to distorted pricing and an inefficient reduction in the
supply of high-quality goods.
This paper studies an extension of the standard price signalling model to a durable goods
duopoly. In this environment the informative signalling equilibrium is free of distortions and
identical to the perfect information equilibrium. We obtain this conclusion for a horizon-
tally and vertically differentiated duopoly market with price-setting competitors engaging in
a game of signalling rivalry: An established firm (“incumbent"), whose quality is known by all
market participants, faces a competitor (“entrant") who is either supplying the same quality
as the incumbent or a superior quality acquired through some product innovation. Both firms
and some fraction of consumers know the entrant’s quality. The uninformed consumers use
prices set by both firms to infer quality information. An important feature of price competition
is that the two firms have opposing interests in conveying information, because the incum-
bent gains and the entrant loses when observed prices make the uninformed consumers more
pessimistic about the entrant’s quality.
In our model consumers are confronted with two price signals concerning a single uncer-
tain variable, the entrant’s quality. For the analysis of equilibrium, we apply two standard
refinements for the uninformed consumers’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs. First, we use the ‘intu-
itive criterion’ of Cho and Kreps (1987). Second, in situations where one of the firms’ pricing
is informative we adopt the ‘unprejudiced belief criterion’ of Bagwell and Ramey (1991) to
the pricing strategy of its competitor, because the intuitive criterion is no longer applicable.
Under the unprejudiced belief criterion the consumers trust in the price signal of the non–
deviating competitor whenever only one of the two firms selects an out-of-equilibrium price.
This means that, given the other firm plays an equilibrium separating strategy, a deviating
firm cannot influence beliefs by deviating to a non-equilibrium price and therefore always
sets its best response price as under perfect information.
The unprejudiced belief criterion therefore excludes all separating equilibria with prices
distorted from full-information prices. We show that these prices constitute the unique sep-
arating equilibrium outcome in our model as long as the fraction of informed consumers is
not too small. If only rather few consumers are informed, there is no informative equilibrium.
The reason is that either the low-type entrant could gain by deviating to the high-type equi-
librium price or the incumbent playing against the high-type would deviate to the low-type
equilibrium price. Thus the firms’ price signals would become contradictory: The entrant
1
would signal that his quality is high and the incumbent that the entrant’s quality is low.
Related Literature
The standard prediction of the literature on price signalling is that quality uncertainty leads to
distorted pricing for signalling purposes. The earliest contributions to this literature consider a
market with a single seller. For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show that a monopolist
may use price and advertisement to convince consumers of the quality of a newly introduced
product. In their model, which is based on repeat purchases of a non-durable good, prices
can be distorted up– or downwards depending on expectations over future sales. Bagwell
and Riordan (1991) consider a monopolist who produces a durable good whose quality may
be high or low. The existence of informed consumers and cost differences between qualities
allow the monopolist to signal high quality through an upward distorted price.1 Basically, our
model extends Bagwell and Riordan (1991) to a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which
one of the two firms offers a quality that is known to the competitor but not to all consumers.
One strand of the literature extends the analysis of price signalling to oligopolistic mar-
kets under the assumption that firms have private information only about their own quality.
They are not informed about the other firms and, therefore, have the same prior about their
competitors’ qualities as the uninformed consumers. Daughety and Reinganum (2007) and
Daughety and Reinganum (2008) examine a horizontally and vertically differentiated duopoly
and n–firm oligopoly, respectively. Price setting takes into account the ex-ante probabilities of
rivals to be high– or low–quality types. Separating equilibria imply upward distorted prices,
increasing in the ex-ante probability of firms being high–types. Similarly, Janssen and Roy
(2010) show for a homogenous oligopoly that fully revealing mixed strategy equilibria exist
in which high–types distort prices upward and low–types randomize prices over an interval,
thereby generating sufficient rents to avoid mimicry of the high–types.
Closer related to the information structure in our model is the other strand of the liter-
ature that assumes the oligopolists to be informed about their rivals’ qualities. Hertzendorf
and Overgaard (2001a) analyze price setting and advertising in a duopoly. To keep the anal-
ysis tractable, they assume that qualities are perfectly negatively correlated and consumers
only know that one firm offers high quality and the other low quality. They apply two refine-
ments that lead to a unique separating and a unique pooling equilibrium. In the separating
equilibrium, a high degree of vertical differentiation leads to upwards distorted prices and a
low degree to downward distorted prices. Yehezkel (2008) introduces some informed con-
sumers into a similar model and examines how pricing and advertising strategies depend on
the fraction of informed consumers.
In Fluet and Garella (2002) the ex ante distribution of the firm’s qualities is such that
either both firms offer low quality or one firm offers low and the other high quality. The
1Linnemer (2002) shows that in the same setup it would be in some cases more profitable for the high-type
firm to combine price and advertising signals.
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authors avoid the use of selection criteria and find multiple separating and pooling equilibria.
For small quality differences separation can only be achieved with a combination of upward
distorted prices and advertisement. This result is similar to a finding by Hertzendorf and
Overgaard (2001b), who show that fully revealing separating equilibria satisfying the unprej-
udiced belief condition do not exist.
These papers differ from our model in that they consider product differentiation only in
the vertical dimension. This implies that the duopolists have a common interest in signalling
different qualities since they earn zero profits if consumers believe that they both offer the
same expected quality. In our model of signalling rivalry such a common interest does not
exist because consumer preferences are differentiated horizontally between the firms, and in
the vertical dimension all consumers have identical preferences. As a consequence, the in-
cumbent always prefers the consumers to believe that the entrant’s quality is identical to his
own quality, whereas the entrant gains by convincing the consumers that he offers a supe-
rior quality. Another feature that distinguishes our model from the above literature is that
the duopolists are not in a symmetric position. Consumers are uninformed only about the en-
trant’s and not about the incumbent’s quality. They interpret the prices of both firms as signals
only about the entrant’s quality. In our analysis, we do not address expenditures on directly
uninformative advertising as an additional signal. Since under our belief refinements only
the full–information equilibrium without distortions survives, there is no role for dissipative
advertising in equilibrium.
From a methodological perspective our analysis is closely related to Bagwell and Ramey
(1991) and Schultz (1999). They study limit pricing by two incumbents to affect the entry
decision of a third firm. The incumbents’ prices signal their information about an industry–
wide parameter. The third firm enters the market only if it concludes that the probability
of a favorable state is sufficiently high. In the paper by Bagwell and Ramey (1991) the
competitors have a common interest, both want to signal an unfavorable state in order to
prevent entry. Introducing the unprejudiced belief refinement, the authors find that only
non–distorted separating equilibria exist. Further, under additional assumptions the intuitive
criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) eliminates all equilibria with pooling. By applying the same
belief refinements to our context, we arrive at similar conclusions for the qualitative features
of equilibrium. Schultz (1999) considers a variation of Bagwell and Ramey (1991) where the
incumbents have conflicting interests, i.e. one incumbent prefers the entrant to stay out of
the market, whereas its competitor profits from entry. Again, separating equilibrium prices
are not distorted. But due to signalling rivalry these equilibria only exist if the effect of entry
on the incumbent’s profits is relatively small. We obtain a related result in our model when
the fraction of informed consumers is rather small.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and, as a refer-
ence point, we derive the equilibrium under full information. Section 3 defines the Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium and explains the belief refinements of our analysis. In Section 4 we
show that under our refinements only the full information equilibrium prices can survive in
an informative equilibrium and that such an equilibrium exists if the fraction of informed
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consumers is not too small. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. The proofs of all formal
results are relegated to an appendix in Section 6.
2 The Model
We employ the demand structure of the standard Hotelling (1929) duopoly with the modifi-
cation that the two firms may offer different qualities. While one of the firms offers a quality
that is publicly known by all market participants, the quality of the other firm is not known to
some share of consumers. This environment may describe a market in which a new firm has
entered to compete against an already established firm. In such a market it is reasonable to
assume that consumers are informed about the established firm’s quality through their prior
experience, but that some consumers are uncertain about the new firm’s product quality. In
the terminology of Nelson (1970), the new good is an experience good so that an uninformed
consumer learns its true quality only after purchase. For convenience, in what follows we
call the established firm the incumbent and the new firm the entrant. Our formal analysis
focuses on post-entry price competition, but in the conclusions in Section 5 we indicate some
implications for market entry decisions.
The incumbent firm is fully informed about the true quality of the entrant. The uninformed
consumers use the firms’ prices to draw inferences about the entrant’s quality. Accordingly,
the price setting behavior of both firms takes into account that prices are quality signals.
There is a unit mass of consumers whose preference characteristic x is uniformly dis-
tributed on the interval [0,1]. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of the good from
either the incumbent I or the entrant E. Given the incumbent’s quality qI and the entrant’s
(expected) quality qE, the valuation of a consumer with characteristic x ∈ [0,1] is
vI(x) = qI − t x , vE(x) = qE − t(1− x) (1)
for the incumbent’s and the entrant’s good. The parameter t reflects the degree of horizontal
product differentiation. The two firms are also vertically differentiated if qI 6= qE. But the
quality differential between the two firms affects the taste of all consumers in the same way,
independently of their characteristic x . This aspect distinguishes our model from the price
signalling models of Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001a) and Fluet and Garella (2002) who
similarly to Shaked and Sutton (1982) assume that consumers differ in their valuation of
quality and that the goods are not horizontally differentiated. In what follows, we assume
that the firms’ qualities are sufficiently high so that each consumer buys one unit of the good.
All consumers observe the incumbent’s price pI and the entrant’s price pE. The critical
consumer type x˜ , who is indifferent between purchasing from firm I and firm E, is then
determined by vI( x˜)− pI = vE( x˜)− pE, and by (1) we have
x˜(pI , pE, qE − qI) =max

0, min

pE − pI − (qE − qI) + t
2t
, 1

. (2)
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All consumers with x < x˜ optimally buy the incumbent’s good, whereas consumers with x > x˜
purchase from the entrant.
There are two possible qualities, qL and qH , with 0 < qL < qH . The incumbent’s quality
is commonly known to be qI = qL. There is uncertainty, however, about the entrant’s quality.
Its quality is qE = qH with ex ante probability λ and qE = qL with probability 1 − λ. One
interpretation is that with probability λ the entrant has realized a product innovation which
increases the ‘standard’ quality qL by the amount qH − qL. We normalize the unit cost of
producing quality qL to zero and assume that the unit cost of producing quality qH is c > 0.
By (2) only the quality differential between the two firms affects the consumers’ demand
decisions. Therefore, we can simplify notation by defining
∆≡ qH − qL. (3)
We assume that the high quality entrant has a competitive advantage because c <∆.
Both firms observe the realization of qE before setting prices. In addition some fraction
γ ∈ (0,1) of consumers becomes informed about the entrant’s true quality before making
demand decisions. Each consumer type x is equally likely to be informed. This means that in
each subset of the consumers’ characteristic set [0,1] the fraction of informed consumers is
identically equal to γ.
The uninformed consumers use the observed prices pI and pE to draw inferences about
the entrant’s quality. We denote their posterior belief that the entrant’s quality is qE = qH
by µ ∈ [0,1]. Thus the uninformed consumers anticipate that the entrant offers the expected
quality µqH+(1−µ)qL = qL+µ∆. Since consumers are risk–neutral with respect to quality, for
given prices pI and pE their demand decisions depend only on the expected quality difference
between the two sellers.
In the uninformed consumers’ expectation the quality difference qE−qI is always equal to
µ∆, independently of the entrant’s true quality. If the entrant’s quality is qE = qL, the informed
consumers know that qE − qI = 0. Therefore, by (2) the incumbent’s and the entrant’s market
shares, DI L and DEL, are given by
DI L(pI , pE,µ) = γ x˜(pI , pE, 0) + (1− γ) x˜(pI , pE,µ∆), (4)
DEL(pI , pE,µ) = 1− DI L(pI , pE,µ).
If qE = qH , the informed consumers know that qE−qI =∆. In this case, the two sellers’ market
shares, DIH and DEH , are equal to
DIH(pI , pE,µ) = γ x˜(pI , pE,∆)+ (1− γ) x˜(pI , pE,µ∆), (5)
DEH(pI , pE,µ) = 1− DIH(pI , pE,µ).
Therefore, if the entrant’s quality is qE = qL, the incumbent’s profit is ΠI L = pI DI L and
the entrant’s profit ΠEL = pE DEL. If qE = qH , the duopolists’ profits are ΠIH = pI DIH and
ΠEH = (pE − c)DEH .
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Note that for all γ ∈ (0,1) it is the case that
∂ΠEL
∂ µ
≥ 0, ∂ΠEH
∂ µ
≥ 0; ∂ΠI L
∂ µ
≤ 0, ∂ΠIH
∂ µ
≤ 0. (6)
Irrespective of the true quality, the entrant never loses and the incumbent never gains when
the uninformed consumers raise their belief that the entrant offers high quality. Since these
consumers interpret the firms’ prices as quality signals, price competition entails a signalling
rivalry: The entrant has an incentive to choose a price that indicates high quality. This is
in conflict with the incumbent’s interest to convince consumers that the entrant offers low
quality.
Before analyzing how the duopolists’ signalling rivalry affects their price competition, we
briefly describe the equilibrium under full information. The firms compete by simultaneously
setting prices and their pricing strategies are contingent on the entrant’s quality. If qE = qL,
we denote the incumbent’s and the entrant’s price by pI L and pEL, respectively; if qE = qH the
firms’ prices are denoted by pIH and pEH . When all consumers know the entrant’s quality, the
firms’ profits can be calculated by setting µ ≡ 0 for qE = qL and µ ≡ 1 for qE = qH .2 The full
information equilibrium prices pˆ = ((pˆI L, pˆEL), (pˆIH , pˆEH)) are then defined by the conditions
for profit maximization so that for all p ≥ 0
ΠI L(pˆI L, pˆEL, 0)≥ ΠI L(p, pˆEL, 0), ΠEL(pˆI L, pˆEL, 0)≥ ΠEL(pˆI L, p, 0), (7)
ΠIH(pˆIH , pˆEH , 1)≥ ΠIH(p, pˆIH , 1), ΠEH(pˆIH , pˆEH , 1)≥ ΠEH(pˆIH , p, 1).
From the corresponding first–order conditions one can easily derive the full information reac-
tion functions
RI L(pˆEL) = max

pˆEL + t
2
, pˆEL − t, 0

(8)
REL(pˆI L) = max

pˆI L + t
2
, pˆI L − t, 0

(9)
RIH(pˆEH) = max

pˆEH + t −∆
2
, pˆEH − t −∆, 0

(10)
REH(pˆIH) = max

pˆIH + t +∆+ c
2
, pˆIH − t +∆, c

. (11)
The solution of (8)–(11) depends on the high quality entrant’s competitive advantage. If
∆− c < 3t the innovation is non-drastic and the incumbent gets positive profits even when
the entrant offers high quality. Otherwise, if ∆− c ≥ 3t, the innovation is drastic and implies
that the incumbent’s market share is zero. The full information equilibrium prices in these
two cases are
pˆI L = t, pˆEL = t, pˆIH = t − (∆− c)/3, pˆEH = t + (∆+ 2c)/3 if ∆− c < 3t, (12)
pˆI L = t, pˆEL = t, pˆIH = 0, pˆEH =∆− t if ∆− c ≥ 3t.
2This is equivalent to setting γ≡ 1.
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If qE = qL, both firms charge the same price and have the same market share DI L = DEL = 1/2.
If qE = qH , the incumbent is disadvantaged against the entrant and, even though he sets a
lower price, his market share for non-drastic innovations DIH = (3t −∆+ c)/(6t) is smaller
than the entrant’s share DEH = (3t +∆− c)/(6t). For drastic innovations we have DIH = 0
and DEH = 1.
3 Equilibrium and Belief Restrictions
We envisage the market to operate in three stages. First, both firms and a fraction γ of con-
sumers observe the realization of the entrant’s quality. Second, the firms compete by simul-
taneously setting prices. Finally, in the third stage the uninformed consumers use observed
prices to update their beliefs about the entrant’s quality, and all consumers decide whether to
buy from the incumbent or the entrant.
In what follows we study pricing strategies of the firms and consumer beliefs that consti-
tute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game. The firms choose their prices contingent on
their information about the entrant’s quality, and the uninformed consumers’ posterior prob-
ability of facing the high quality entrant is a function of the firms’ prices. In equilibrium, each
firm’s price maximizes its profit and the uninformed consumer’s posterior belief is consistent
with Bayesian updating.3
More formally, (p∗,µ∗(·)) = ((p∗I L, p∗EL), (p∗IH , p∗EH),µ∗(·)) with µ∗: IR2+ → [0,1] is a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) if
(a) for Q = L, H
p∗IQ = argmaxpΠIQ(p, p
∗
EQ,µ
∗(p, p∗EQ)), (13)
p∗EQ = argmaxpΠEQ(p
∗
IQ, p,µ
∗(p∗IQ, p)), (14)
and (b)
µ∗(p∗I L, p
∗
EL) = 1−µ∗(p∗IH , p∗EH) = 0, if p∗I L 6= p∗IH or p∗EL 6= p∗EH , (15)
µ∗(p∗I L, p
∗
EL) = µ
∗(p∗IH , p
∗
EH) = λ, if p
∗
I L = p
∗
IH and p
∗
EL = p
∗
EH . (16)
Equilibrium conditions (13) and (14) state that, for each quality qE ∈ {qL, qH}, the incum-
bent and the entrant choose their prices to maximize profits, taking the competitor’s price
and the uninformed consumers’ beliefs µ∗(·) as given. Equilibrium conditions (15) and (16)
require that on the equilibrium path the buyers’ belief is consistent with Bayes’ rule. The buy-
ers become fully informed about the entrant’s true quality not only in a two–sided separating
equilibrium, where p∗i L 6= p∗iH for both i ∈ {I , E}, but also in a one–sided separating equilibrium,
where p∗i L 6= p∗iH for some i ∈ {I , E} and p∗j L = p∗jH for j 6= i. Prices remain uninformative only
3We restrict ourselves to pure strategy equilibria.
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if p∗i L = p∗iH for both i ∈ {I , E}. In such a pooling equilibrium the posterior belief is equal to the
a priori probability λ. Since we are interested in the existence and properties of informative
equilibria, we ignore pooling in our subsequent analysis.
By (13) and (14), the uninformed consumers’ quality expectations affect the duopolists’
pricing decisions. But, conditions (15) and (16) impose restrictions on expectations only
for prices that are actually chosen in equilibrium. Since out–of–equilibrium beliefs remain
arbitrary, there are multiple equilibria, which are a typical feature of signalling games. This
is so because the profit of a deviation from the equilibrium price depends on the uninformed
consumers’ interpretation of this deviation. For example, the incumbent may be deterred from
changing its price simply because consumers would interpret this as a signal that the entrant’s
quality is high. Similarly, the entrant may be kept from changing its price if consumers view
this as a signal of low quality. Without restrictions on consumer beliefs multiple equilibria
with both upward and downward distorted prices can be found .
To avoid this problem, the literature usually applies refinements that impose restrictions
on out–of–equilibrium beliefs. A prominent refinement is the ‘intuitive criterion’ of Cho and
Kreps (1987), which has been used in a variety of price signalling games.4 Unfortunately,
this criterion is not generally applicable in the present context because it is defined for sig-
nalling games where each player has private information only about his own and not the
other players’ characteristics. In our model, however, the duopolists have common private
information and not only the entrant’s but also the incumbent’s price may signal the entrant’s
quality. Therefore, the intuitive criterion cannot be used in our model if both firms’ prices
are informative. Nonetheless, it remains applicable if one of the firms’ equilibrium prices are
uninformative, i.e. if p∗i L = p∗iH for some i ∈ {I , E}. In this case, the intuitive criterion can be
used to refine beliefs for out–of–equilibrium prices of firm j 6= i.
Consider the incumbent in a situation where the entrant charges p∗EL = p∗EH and the in-
cumbent knows that the entrant’s quality is low. Suppose the incumbent wishes to deviate
to some price pI if the uninformed consumers interpret pI as a signal that indicates a low
quality entrant. Then the idea of the intuitive criterion is that pI should indeed convince
the consumers that the entrant offers low quality if the following is true: If the incumbent
knew that the entrant’s quality is high, he would not gain from deviating to pI even if the
consumers would respond favorably for the incumbent by believing that pI indicates a low
quality entrant.
An analogous argument applies to the high quality entrant in a situation where the incum-
bent’s pricing p∗I L = p∗IH reveals no information. In this case, the intuitive criterion requires the
uninformed consumers to believe that a price pE signals high quality if for this belief deviating
to pE is profitable only for the high quality entrant and not for the low quality entrant.
More formally, the PBE (p∗,µ∗(·)) satisfies the intuitive criterion if the following two con-
ditions (a) and (b) are satisfied:
4See, for example, Bagwell and Riordan (1991), Bagwell and Ramey (1991), Bester (1993), Bester and
Ritzberger (2001).
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(a) If p∗EL = p∗EH = p∗E, then µ∗(pI , p∗E) = 0 for all pI such that
ΠIH(pI , p
∗
E, 0)≤ ΠIH(p∗IH , p∗E,µ∗(p∗IH , p∗E)) (17)
and
ΠI L(pI , p
∗
E, 0)> ΠI L(p
∗
I L, p
∗
E,µ
∗(p∗I L, p
∗
E)). (18)
(b) If p∗I L = p∗IH = p∗I , then µ∗(p∗I , pE) = 1 for all pE such that
ΠEL(p
∗
I , pE, 1)≤ ΠEL(p∗I , p∗EL,µ∗(p∗I , p∗EL)) (19)
and
ΠEH(p
∗
I , pE, 1)> ΠEH(p
∗
I , p
∗
EH ,µ
∗(p∗I , p
∗
EH)). (20)
As a refinement for situations where firm i ∈ {I , E} defects from the equilibrium and firm
j 6= i uses a separating strategy p∗j L 6= p∗jH , we employ the ‘unprejudiced belief criterion’ intro-
duced by Bagwell and Ramey (1991). The basic idea of this criterion is that upon observing
an out–of–equilibrium price pair (pI , pE) the uninformed consumers rationalize their obser-
vation with the fewest number of deviations from the equilibrium strategies. Therefore, if a
price pair occurs where one of the prices is out–of–equilibrium while the other price belongs
to the separating pricing strategy of the competitor, the consumers believe that the entrant’s
quality is signaled by the competitor.
Actually, since there are only two types of the entrant, in our context it is sufficient to
consider a simplified version of the unprejudiced belief criterion: If only the entrant chooses
an out–of–equilibrium price pE and the incumbent’s equilibrium price p
∗
IH indicates a high
quality entrant, then the uninformed consumers should conclude that the entrant offers high
quality; there are no belief restrictions if the incumbent’s price p∗I L signals low quality. Indeed,
a high quality signal of the incumbent looks rather convincing since it is against his interest
to admit that his competitor offers a superior good. An analogous reasoning applies when the
uninformed consumers conjecture that the price pI constitutes a unilateral deviation by the
incumbent. In this situation, they should infer from the entrant’s price p∗EL that his quality is
low; there are no belief restrictions if the entrant’s price is p∗EH . Again, this seems plausible
because expecting high quality makes little sense if the entrant acknowledges that his quality
is low.
More formally, the PBE (p∗,µ∗(·)) satisfies the (simplified) unprejudiced belief criterion if
the following two conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied:
(a) If p∗I L 6= p∗IH , then µ∗(p∗IH , pE) = 1 for all pE 6= p∗EL.
(b) If p∗EL 6= p∗EH , then µ∗(pI , p∗EL) = 0 for all pI 6= p∗IH .
Notice that in a two–sided separating equilibrium the criterion does not impose belief re-
strictions on the out–of–equilibrium price constellations (p∗IH , p∗EL) and (p∗I L, p∗EH), under which
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the signals of the incumbent and the entrant appear contradictory. For these constellations it
is not clear whether the incumbent or the entrant has deviated from his equilibrium strategy.
In what follows, we call a PBE (p∗,µ∗(·)) that satisfies the intuitive and the unprejudiced
belief criterion a signalling equilibrium.5 In the following section, we investigate the existence
and properties of equilibria where prices reveal the entrant’s quality.
4 Informative Equilibria
One–Sided Separating Equilibria
We start with the analysis of one–sided separating equilibria, in which one firm chooses a
pooling and the other a separating pricing strategy. We will show that such equilibria typi-
cally do not exist, except for special parameter constellations. First, consider the case where
the incumbent’s price p∗I = p∗I L = p∗IH is independent of the entrant’s quality, whereas the
entrant chooses quality contingent prices p∗EL and p∗EH with p∗EL 6= p∗EH . Because in equilib-
rium the uninformed consumers infer the entrant’s quality from his price, their beliefs satisfy
µ∗(p∗I , p∗EL) = 0 and µ∗(p∗I , p∗EH) = 1. The following lemma establishes necessary conditions
for this type of equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the prices p, with pI = pI L = pIH , pEL 6= pEH , can be supported as a
signalling equilibrium (p,µ(·)) by some beliefs µ(·). Then p must satisfy
pEL = argmaxpΠEL(pI , p, 0), (21)
pI = argmaxpΠIH(p, pEH , 1) = argmaxpΠI L(p, pEL, 0), (22)
pEH maximizes ΠEH(pI , p, 1) subject to ΠEL(pI , p, 1)≤ ΠEL(pI , pEL, 0). (23)
Condition (21) simply states that the low quality entrant’s price reaction against pI is not
distorted by signalling considerations. Indeed, some price p not satisfying (21) can maximize
the low quality seller’s profit only if µ(pI , p) > 0. But this is inconsistent with an equilibrium
where prices reveal the true quality. The same argument underlies the first condition in (22)
for the incumbent’s price when competing against the high quality entrant. The incumbent’s
price reaction against pEH cannot be distorted because the consumers’ belief that the entrant
has high quality is already the worst possible belief from the incumbent’s perspective.
The second condition for pI in (22) is implied by part (b) of the unprejudiced belief
criterion. This criterion restricts the consumers’ belief to µ(p, pEL) = 0 for all p 6= pI . Further,
Bayes’ rule in (15) requires that µ(pI , pEL) = 0. Thus, the incumbent’s pricing has no impact
on consumer beliefs when facing the low quality entrant, and so in this situation there are
also no signalling distortions.
5In our analysis the term ‘unprejudiced belief criterion’ always refers to the simplified version defined above.
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Finally, the constraint in condition (23) has to be satisfied because otherwise the low
quality entrant would gain by imitating the high quality entrant’s price. Further, the intuitive
criterion implies that consumers infer high quality whenever the entrant gains by deviating
to some price satisfying this constraint. Accordingly, the high quality entrant’s price pEH must
solve the constrained maximization problem in (23).
Lemma 1 allows us to show that a one–sided separating equilibrium with p∗EL 6= p∗EH exists
at most for a single value of the parameter γ. Since there is no reason for why the fraction of
informed consumers should be identical to this value, an equilibrium of this type generically
fails to exist.
Proposition 1 For all γ 6= max {t/(t +∆),∆/(t +∆)} there exists no signalling equilibrium
(p∗,µ∗(·)) such that p∗I L = p∗IH and p∗EL 6= p∗EH .
The nonexistence result stated in Proposition 1 is a straightforward implication of Lemma
1. The lemma shows that prices in a one–sided separating equilibrium have to satisfy four
conditions. Yet, such an equilibrium determines only three prices. This means that not all
conditions can hold simultaneously, unless the exogenous parameters accidentally make one
of the conditions redundant. The following lemma shows that a similar observation applies
to the other type of one–sided separating equilibria, in which the entrant adopts a pooling
strategy p∗E = p∗EL = p∗EH and only the incumbent’s prices p∗I L and p∗EH reveal the entrant’s
quality so that µ∗(p∗E, p∗I L) = 0 and µ∗(p∗E, p∗IH) = 1.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the prices p, with pI L 6= pIH , pE = pEL = pEH , can be supported as a
signalling equilibrium (p,µ(·)) by some beliefs µ(·). Then p must satisfy
pIH = argmaxpΠIH(p, pE, 1), (24)
pE = argmaxpΠEL(pI L, p, 0) = argmaxpΠEH(pIH , p, 1), (25)
pI L maximizes ΠI L(p, pE, 0) subject to ΠIH(p, pE, 0)≤ ΠIH(pIH , pE, 1). (26)
By our next proposition, the implications Lemmas 2 are similar to Lemma 1. In fact,
Lemma 2 implies that a one–sided separating equilibrium with p∗I L 6= p∗IH typically fails to
exist.
Proposition 2 For generic values of γ there exists no signalling equilibrium (p∗,µ∗(·)) such that
p∗I L 6= p∗IH and p∗EL = p∗EH .
Our results so far show that in an informative equilibrium it cannot happen that one of
the duopolists adopts a pooling strategy. Propositions 1 and 2 eliminate one–sided pooling
by combining the intuitive and the unprejudiced belief criterion. This leaves a two–sided
separating equilibrium as the remaining candidate for a signalling equilibrium.
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Two–Sided Separating Equilibria
In a two–sided separating equilibrium the uninformed consumers’ equilibrium belief is
µ∗(p∗I L, p∗EL) = 0 and µ∗(p∗IH , p∗EH) = 1 as p∗I L 6= p∗IH and p∗EL 6= p∗EH . Since each firm’s price is
informative, the intuitive criterion is no longer applicable. Therefore, only the unprejudiced
belief criterion plays a role in the following lemma which provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for a two–sided separating equilibrium.
Lemma 3 The prices p, with pI L 6= pIH , pEL 6= pEH , can be supported as a signalling equilibrium
(p,µ(·)) by some beliefs µ(·) if and only if
(a) p is identical to the perfect information equilibrium pˆ, and
(b) there exists some µ¯ ∈ [0,1] such that
ΠIH(pIH , pEH , 1)≥ ΠIH(pI L, pEH , µ¯), ΠEL(pI L, pEL, 0)≥ ΠEL(pI L, pEH , µ¯). (27)
By statement (a) of Lemma 3, in a two–sided separating equilibrium the firms’ prices are
identical to the outcome of price competition under full information of all market participants
about the entrant’s quality. Thus, even though prices act as signals, they are not distorted by
incentive restrictions. This observation is a well–known implication of the unprejudiced belief
refinement (see Bagwell and Ramey (1991)).6 The idea is simply that the high quality entrant
can ignore signalling effects when already the incumbent’s price convinces the uninformed
consumers of high quality. Similarly, the incumbent does not have to resort to distorted pric-
ing to indicate a low quality entrant, because the entrant himself already reveals his quality
through his price setting strategy. In a two–sided separating equilibrium, therefore, the firms’
prices are determined as mutually undistorted best responses against the competitor and are
thus identical to the full information equilibrium.
While prices are not distorted by signalling effects, statement (b) of Lemma 3 shows that
they have to satisfy an incentive compatibility restriction, which is related to the signalling
rivalry between the duopolists. The uninformed consumers will be perplexed when they
observe the out–of-equilibrium price pair (pˆI L, pˆEH). These prices are contradictory because
the incumbent’s price signals a low quality entrant and the entrant’s price a high quality. Also,
it is not clear which firm has deviated from its equilibrium strategy. The prices (pˆI L, pˆEH) could
originate from the equilibrium pair (pˆIH , pˆEH) because the incumbent has deviated to pˆI L; or
they could originate from the equilibrium pair (pˆI L, pˆEL) because the entrant has deviated to
pˆEH .
Condition (27) states that there must be some belief µ¯ = µ(pˆI L, pˆEH) that deters both
kinds of deviations. On the one hand, by the first inequality in (27), µ¯ must be high enough
so as to make it unattractive for the incumbent to deviate from pˆIH to pˆI L. On the other
6Yehezkel (2006) proposes a generalization of the unprejudiced belief criterion that eliminates all possible
separating equilibria but the full information outcome.
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γ¯|∆=10 t = 2 t = 4 t = 6 t = 8 t = 10 t = 12
c = 5 0.870 0.700 0.645 0.662 0.705 0.738
c = 7 0.775 0.736 0.657 0.587 0.634 0.671
c = 9 0.846 0.736 0.645 0.572 0.548 0.590
Table 1: Numerical values for γ¯.
hand, the second inequality in (27) requires that µ¯ is small enough so that the entrant cannot
gain by deviating from pˆEL to pˆEH . To examine whether both inequalities can be satisfied, we
first consider the case of non-drastic innovations (∆− c < 3t) and then drastic innovations
(∆− c ≥ 3t).
Non-drastic Innovations
Whether condition (b) of Lemma 3 is satisfied for p = pˆ, depends on how large the fraction
γ of informed consumers is. As the proof of our next result shows, Lemma 3 implies that a
two–sided separating equilibrium exists if and only if γ is not too small.
Proposition 3 Let ∆− c < 3t. There exists a γ¯ = γ¯(t,∆, c) ∈ (0, 1) such that the following
holds:
(a) If γ≥ γ¯, then there exists a signalling equilibrium (p∗,µ∗(·)) with p∗I L 6= p∗IH and p∗EL 6= p∗EH .
The prices p∗ in this equilibrium are identical to the perfect information equilibrium pˆ.
(b) If γ < γ¯, there exists no signalling equilibrium (p∗,µ∗(·)) such that p∗I L 6= p∗IH and p∗EL 6= p∗EH .
In a two–sided separating equilibrium prices are not distorted by signalling. The incum-
bent or the entrant can gain by a unilateral deviation only because this changes the unin-
formed consumers’ beliefs. Therefore, a deviation is unprofitable as long as sufficiently many
consumers are informed. This explains why (pˆ,µ∗(·)) can constitute a signalling equilibrium
for γ ≥ γ¯. If γ < γ¯, then the firms’ signalling rivalry is too intense to prevent profitable devi-
ations: Either the incumbent will defect from the equilibrium if qE = qH , or the entrant will
defect if qE = qL. As observed by Schultz (1999) in a different context, conflicting interests
may thus rule out the existence of a two–sided separating equilibrium for some parameter
constellations.
In Table 1 some numerical calculations illustrate how γ¯ depends on c and t if∆= 10. They
reveal that γ¯ does not depend monotonically on the parameters of our model. In particular,
if the measure t of horizontal differentiation increases, γ¯ first decreases and then increases.
Our next result shows that this is true in general.
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Proposition 4 (a) For t sufficiently large the critical value γ¯(t,∆, c), stated in Proposition 3,
satisfies
∂ γ¯(t,∆, c)
∂ t
> 0,
∂ γ¯(t,λ∆,λc)
∂ λ

λ=1 < 0. (28)
(b) For t sufficiently close to (∆− c)/3,7
∂ γ¯(t,∆, c)
∂ t
< 0,
∂ γ¯(t,λ∆,λc)
∂ λ

λ=1 > 0. (29)
Prices can be used as credible signals because of their effect on the informed consumers’
demand. When the degree t of horizontal differentiation is sufficiently large, some of these
consumers still purchase from the firm that has deviated to a higher price. In this situation, γ¯
is increasing in t because the price sensitivity of demand is negatively related to the product
differentiation parameter t. Conversely, fewer informed consumers are required for the two–
sided separating equilibrium if ∆− c is increased to λ∆− λc, with λ > 1. Such an increase
improves the competitiveness of the high quality entrant. It facilitates the requirements for
an equilibrium because it raises the price differences |pˆIH − pˆI L| and |pˆEL − pˆEH |. Therefore,
a deviation of the incumbent from pˆIH to pˆI L or of the entrant from pˆEL to pˆEH becomes less
profitable, and a smaller fraction γ¯ of informed consumers suffices for existence of a signalling
equilibrium.
As part (b) of Proposition 4 shows, the comparative statics properties of γ¯ are reversed
if t is relatively small. Then, by deviating from the full information price to a higher price,
a firm loses the entire demand of the informed consumers. Therefore, the price sensitivity
of the informed consumers’ demand plays no role. Instead, because equilibrium profits are
increasing in t, the incentives for deviation become weaker if t increases. In particular, the
incumbent is driven out of the market by the high quality entrant and receives zero profits in
the limit as t → (∆− c)/3. Therefore, when t becomes small more informed consumers are
required to prevent the incumbent from deviating to pˆI L.
Drastic Innovations
Now we show that Proposition 3 holds also for drastic innovations: if the fraction γ of in-
formed consumers is not too small, then the full information prices pˆ in (12) can be supported
as a signalling equilibrium by some beliefs µ∗(·). We begin with the following lemma:
Lemma 4 Let ∆− c > 3t. If and only if µ¯≥ (∆− t)/∆, then
ΠIH(pˆIH , pˆEH , 1)≥ ΠIH(pˆI L, pˆEH , µ¯), (30)
i.e. the incumbent does not gain from deviating to pˆI L if qE = qH .
7Recall that t > (∆− c)/3
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Since the incumbent makes zero profit at the prices (pˆIH , pˆEH), he could gain by deviating
to pˆI L only if this attracts some uninformed consumers. Lemma 4 shows that this is not pos-
sible as long as the uninformed consumers remain sufficiently optimistic about the entrant’s
quality when observing the out–of–equilibrium prices (pˆI L, pˆEH).
Lemma 5 Let ∆− c > 3t and µ¯≥ (∆− t)/∆. If and only if γ≥ (2∆− 3t)/(2∆− 2t), then
ΠEL(pˆI L, pˆEL, 0)≥ ΠEL(pˆI L, pˆEH , µ¯). (31)
i.e. the entrant does not gain from deviating to pˆEH if qE = qL.
By deviating to pˆEH the low quality entrant loses the demand from the informed con-
sumers. But, by Lemma 4 he attracts all uninformed consumers. A deviation is therefore not
profitable only if the fraction of informed consumers is not too small.
Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 immediately imply the following extension of Proposition 3 to the case
of drastic innovations:
Proposition 5 Let ∆− c > 3t and define γ˜≡ (2∆− 3t)/(2∆− 2t).
(a) If γ≥ γ˜, there exists a signalling equilibrium (p∗,µ∗(·)) with p∗I L 6= p∗IH and p∗EL 6= p∗EH . The
prices p∗ in this equilibrium are identical to the perfect information equilibrium pˆ.
(b) If γ < γ˜, there exists no signalling equilibrium (p∗,µ∗(·)) such that p∗I L 6= p∗IH and p∗EL 6= p∗EH .
Since ∂ γ˜/∂ t < 0 and ∂ γ˜/∂∆ > 0, the comparative statics properties of γ˜ are in line with
part (b) of Proposition 4. Interestingly, in the limit t → 0 we obtain γ˜→ 1. This means that in
a homogenous market a separating signalling equilibrium cannot exist with some uninformed
consumers. The intuition is that the incumbent is driven out of the market by the high quality
entrant, and for t → 0 also the low quality entrant’s profits become negligible at the full
information prices. Therefore, if qE = qH the incumbent will deviate from p∗IH to p∗I L if this
attracts some uninformed consumers. Should no uninformed consumer purchase from the
incumbent, this means that all uninformed consumers turn to the entrant when observing the
prices (p∗I L, p∗EH). But this implies that the low quality entrant will gain by deviating from p∗EL
to p∗EH .
5 Conclusion
Our analysis shows that a firm may not have to resort to distorted pricing to signal its quality
to the uninformed consumers. If its quality is known to a competitor, then the prices of both
firms become quality signals and signalling competition may lead to non–distorted pricing
in equilibrium. Indeed, under two belief refinements that have frequently been used in the
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literature, we show that prices convey quality information only if the are identical to the
equilibrium under full information.
This finding has obvious implications for other strategic choices. For example, consider
the market entry decision of a firm whose quality is not publicly observable. As long as
sufficiently many consumers are informed, our analysis indicates that entry decisions are not
distorted when at least one of the incumbent firms learns the new firm’s quality after it has
entered the market. A similar conclusion obtains for R&D investments in product innovation
when some consumers cannot observe whether the investment has been successful or not. If
competing firms and a sufficient fraction of consumers become informed about the outcome,
our results suggest that the incentives for product innovation are not distorted by the presence
of uninformed consumers.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Since pEL 6= pEH implies µ(pI , pEL) = 0 and ∂ΠEL/∂ µ > 0, it follows from
equilibrium condition (14) that for all p ≥ 0
ΠEL(pI , pEL, 0)≥ ΠEL(pI , p,µ(pI , p))≥ ΠEL(pI , p, 0). (32)
This proves that (21) must hold. Analogously, µ(pI , pEH) = 1 and ∂ΠIH/∂ µ < 0 imply by (13)
that for all p ≥ 0
ΠIH(pI , pEH , 1)≥ ΠIH(p, pEH ,µ(p, pEH))≥ ΠIH(p, pEH , 1). (33)
This proves that pI must satisfy the first condition in (22).
Suppose that pI does not satisfy the second condition in (22). Since part (b) of the un-
prejudiced belief criterion implies µ(p, pEL) = 0 for all p 6= pI , then there exist some p such
that
ΠI L(pI , pEL,µ(pI , pEL)) = ΠI L(pI , pEL, 0)< ΠI L(p, pEL, 0) = ΠI L(p, pEL,µ(p, pEL)). (34)
This is a contradiction to the condition that in equilibrium pI has to satisfy (13) for Q = L.
Note that pEH must satisfy the constraint in (23) because equilibrium condition (14) im-
plies that
ΠEL(pI , pEL, 0) = ΠEL(pI , pEL,µ(pI , pEL))≥ ΠEL(pI , pEH ,µ(pI , pEH)) = ΠEL(pI , pEH , 1). (35)
Suppose that pEH does not solve the maximization problem in (23). Then there exists some
p that satisfies the constraint in (23) and ΠEH(pI , p, 1) > ΠEH(pI , pEH , 1). Because part (b) of
the intuitive criterion then implies µ(pI , p) = 1, this yields
ΠEH(pI , p,µ(pI , p)) = ΠEH(pI , p, 1)> ΠEH(pI , pEH , 1) = ΠEH(pI , pEH ,µ(pI , pEH)), (36)
a contradiction to equilibrium condition (14) for Q = H. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Using the full-information best-response functions to solve the con-
ditions for (21) and (22) in Lemma 1, we get the prices
p∗I = t, p
∗
EL = t, p
∗
EH = t +∆. (37)
If the constraint in (23) is not binding, we obtain the high-quality entrant’s best-response
p∗EH =max

2t +∆+ c
2
,∆

. (38)
This, however, is inconsistent with the last equation in (37) as ∆ > c and t > 0. If the
constraint in (23) is binding, then ΠEL(p∗I , p∗EH , 1) = ΠEL(p∗I , p∗EL, 0). By (37) this equality is
equivalent to
(∆+ t)(t − γ∆)
2t
=
t
2
(39)
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for ∆≤ t and
(∆+ t)(1− γ)
2
=
t
2
(40)
for ∆ > t. From these equations it follows that the conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied only
if γ= t/(t +∆) if ∆≤ t and γ=∆/(t +∆) if ∆> t. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: The argument is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: From the full-information best responses for (24) and (25) in Lemma
2, we obtain the solution
p∗I L =
3t + 2∆+ 4c
3
, p∗IH =
3t −∆+ c
3
, p∗E =
3t +∆+ 2c
3
(41)
for ∆− c ≤ 3t and
p∗I L = 2∆− 3t, p∗IH = 0, p∗E =∆− t (42)
for ∆− c > 3t.
If the constraint in (26) is not binding and ∆− c ≤ 3t, the full-information best-response
of I L is given by p∗I L = max {(6t +∆+ 2c)/6, (∆+ 2c)/3}. This, however, is inconsistent
with the first equation in (41). If the constraint in (26) is not binding and ∆− c > 3t, the
full-information best-response of I L is given by p∗I L = max {∆/2,∆− 2t}. This, however, is
inconsistent with the first equation in (42).
For ∆− c < 3t, if the constraint in (26) is not binding, the full-information best-response
of I L is given by p∗I L = max {(6t +∆+ 2c)/6, (∆+ 2c)/3}. This, however, is inconsistent
with the first equation in (41). If the constraint in (26) is binding, then ΠIH(p∗I L, p∗E, 0) =
ΠIH(p∗IH , p∗E, 1). If ∆− c < 3t ≤∆+ 2c, this equality is by (41) equivalent to
0=
(3t −∆+ c)2
18t
. (43)
If ∆ + 2c < 3t ≤ 4∆ + 2c, then the equality ΠIH(p∗I L, p∗E, 0) = ΠIH(p∗IH , p∗E, 1) by (41) is
equivalent to
(1− γ)(3t + 2∆+ 4c)(3t −∆− 2c)
18t
=
(3t −∆+ c)2
18t
. (44)
Finally, if 4∆+ 2c ≤ 3t, then by (41) then the equality ΠIH(p∗I L, p∗E, 0) = ΠIH(p∗IH , p∗E, 1) is
equivalent to
(3t + 2∆+ 4c)(3t − 3γ∆−∆− 2c)
18t
=
(3t −∆+ c)2
18t
. (45)
As ∆− c < 3t, the equations (43) – (45) have either no solution or a unique solution in γ
Therefore, the conditions of Lemma 2 can hold at most for particular values of γ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: We first show that (a) and (b) must hold in a signalling equilibrium
(p,µ(·)). By (13)
ΠIH(pIH , pEH , 1)≥ ΠIH(p, pEH ,µ(p, pEH))≥ ΠIH(p, pEH , 1) (46)
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for all p ≥ 0, where the second inequality follows from ∂ΠIH/∂ µ < 0. Similarly, (13) and
part (b) of the unprejudiced belief criterion imply
ΠI L(pI L, pEL, 0)≥ ΠI L(p, pEL,µ(p, pEL)) = ΠI L(p, pEL, 0) (47)
for all p 6= pIH . By continuity of ΠI L(·, pEL, 0), therefore also
ΠI L(pI L, pEL, 0)≥ ΠI L(pIH , pEL, 0). (48)
By an analogous argument it follows from (13), ∂ΠEL/∂ µ > 0, and part (a) of the unpreju-
diced belief criterion that
ΠEL(pI L, pEL, 0)≥ ΠEL(pI L, p, 0), ΠEH(pIH , pEH , 1)≥ ΠEH(pIH , p, 1) (49)
for all p ≥ 0. By (46)–(49), p satisfies the conditions that define pˆ in (7). This proves that
(p,µ(·)) must satisfy claim (a) that p = pˆ. Note that by (13) and (14)
ΠIH(pIH , pEH , 1) ≥ ΠIH(pI L, pEH ,µ(pI L, pEH)), (50)
ΠEL(pI L, pEL, 0) ≥ ΠEL(pI L, pEH ,µ(pI L, pEH)).
This proves that statement (b) holds for µ¯≡ µ(pI L, pEH).
Next we show that (pˆ,µ(·)) is a signalling equilibrium for some µ(·) only if (b) holds. Note
that the intuitive criterion does not apply to pˆ because pˆI L 6= pˆIH and pˆEL 6= pˆEH . In line with
the unprejudiced belief criterion, define
µ(pˆIH , p)≡ 1 for all p 6= pˆEL, µ(p, pˆEL)≡ 0 for all p 6= pˆIH , µ(pˆIH , pˆEL)≡ λ. (51)
Further, if (27) in part (b) of the lemma holds for p = pˆ we can set
µ(pˆI L, p)≡ 0 for all p 6= pˆEH , µ(p, pˆEH)≡ 1 for all p 6= pˆI L, µ(pˆI L, pˆEH)≡ µ¯. (52)
The beliefs for all other price pairs (pI , pE) play no role in the definition of a PBE and so they
are arbitrary. Since µ(pˆI L, pˆEL) = 0 and µ(pˆIH , pˆEH) = 1 by (51) and (52), these beliefs satisfy
Bayes rule (15) in part (b) of the definition of a PBE. Further since pˆ satisfies (7) and (50)
holds for p = pˆ, it is easily verified that (pˆ,µ(·)) satisfies also the conditions (13) and (14) for
profit maximization in part (a) of the definition of a PBE. This proves that pˆ and the beliefs
µ(·) in (51) and (52) constitute a signalling equilibrium if (27) in part (b) of the lemma holds
for p = pˆ. If the latter condition does not hold, then there is no belief µ(pI L, pEH) that satisfies
both conditions in (50) for p = pˆ. In this case, there exists no PBE (p,µ(·)) with p = pˆ because
at least one of the conditions (13) and (14) for profit maximization is violated. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: By Lemma 3 it is sufficient to show that for p = pˆ (27) has a solution
µ¯ ∈ [0,1] if and only if γ≥ γ¯. Using pˆ in (12), we haveΠIH(pˆIH , pˆEH , 1) = (3t −∆+ c)2/(18t)
and
ΠIH(pˆI L, pˆEH , µ¯) =
(1− γ)(∆(1− 3µ¯) + 2c+ 3t)
6
+min

0,
γ(3t − 2∆− 2c)
6

, (53)
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because if qE = qH the incumbent’s demand from the informed consumers is zero at (pˆI L, pˆEH)
for 3t ≤ 2(∆− c). Therefore, solving the the first inequality in (27) for µ¯ yields
µ¯≥ µ¯I(γ)≡ 9t∆(1− γ)− (∆− c)
2
9t∆(1− γ) +max

0,
γ
1− γ
2∆− 2c− 3t
3∆

. (54)
By (12), we have ΠEL(pˆI L, pˆEL, 0) = t/2 and
ΠEL(pˆI L, pˆEH , µ¯) =
(1− γ)(3t + 2c+∆)(3t − 2c+∆(3µ¯− 1))
18t
(55)
+min

0,
γ[(3t)2− (∆+ 2c)2]
18t

,
because if qE = qL the entrant’s demand from the informed consumers is zero at (pˆI L, pˆEH) for
3t ≤∆+ 2c. Therefore, solving the the second inequality in (27) for µ¯ yields
µ¯≤ µ¯E(γ)≡ (∆+ 2c)
2
3∆(1− γ)(3t + 2c+∆) −max

0,
γ
1− γ
∆+ 2c− 3t
3∆

. (56)
Thus, the two inequalities in (27) admit a solution µ¯ if and only if µ¯I(γ) ≤ µ¯E(γ). It is
easily verified that
0< µ¯E(0)< µ¯I(0)< 1, limγ→1[µ¯I(γ)− µ¯E(γ)]< 0, µ¯′I(γ)< 0, µ¯′E(γ)> 0. (57)
Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem there exist a (unique) γ¯ ∈ (0,1) such that
µ¯I(γ¯) = µ¯E(γ¯) ∈ (0, 1) and µ¯I(γ)≤ µ¯E(γ) if and only if γ≥ γ¯. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: By the proof of Proposition 3, γ¯ is uniquely determined by the
solution of µ¯I(γ¯|t,∆, c) = µ¯E(γ¯|t,∆, c), where µ¯I and µ¯E are defined in (54) and (56) and
satisfy (57). For 3t >max[2(∆− c),∆+ 2c] one obtains
∂ µ¯I(γ¯|t,∆, c)/∂ t > 0, ∂ µ¯E(γ¯|t,∆, c)/∂ t < 0, (58)
which immediately implies the first inequality in (28). Since µ¯I(γ¯|λt,λ∆,λc) = µ¯I(γ¯|t,∆, c)
and µ¯E(γ¯|λt,λ∆,λc) = µ¯E(γ¯|t,∆, c), the first inequality in (28) implies the second inequality
in (28). This proves part (a).
To prove part (b), let ∆− c < 3t < min[2(∆− c),∆+ 2c]. Then solving µ¯I(γ¯|t,∆, c) =
µ¯E(γ¯|t,∆, c) yields
γ¯=
∆(27t2+ 3t∆−∆2) + 12c t∆+ 3c2(∆− 5t)− 2c3
18t2(3t + 2c+∆)
. (59)
Since
lim
t→(∆−c)/3
∂ γ¯
∂ t
=− 3(∆+ 2c)
2(2∆+ c)2
< 0, (60)
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this proves the first inequality in (29). As γ¯ in (59) is homogenous of degree zero in (t,∆, c)
the first inequality implies the second inequality in (29). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: Note that ΠIH(pˆIH , pˆEH , 1) = 0 because pˆIH = 0. Therefore (30) holds
if and only if no consumer purchases from the incumbent upon observing (pˆI L, pˆEH). The
uninformed consumers’ demand is zero if and only if even the consumer with x = 0 does not
prefer to buy from the incumbent. This is the case if
qL − pˆI L ≤ µ¯qH + (1− µ¯)qL − pˆEH − t. (61)
Since pˆEH − pˆI L = ∆− 2t, this is identical to µ¯ ≥ (∆− t)/∆. Clearly, if even the uninformed
consumers do not purchase from the incumbent, then at the prices (pˆI L, pˆEH) also the informed
consumer do not buy from the incumbent because they know that qE = qH . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: We first show that no informed consumer purchases from the low quality
entrant if he deviates to p∗EH . This is the case if even the informed consumer with x = 1 does
not buy from the entrant, i.e. if
qL − pˆI L − t ≥ qL − pˆEH . (62)
Since pˆEH − pˆI L =∆− 2t, this is identical to ∆≥ 3t and is satisfied as ∆− c ≥ 3t.
While a deviation to p∗EH leads to zero demand from the informed consumers, by the
proof of Lemma 4 all uninformed consumers buy from the entrant at the prices (pˆI L, pˆEH).
Therefore,
ΠEL(pˆI L, pˆEH , µ¯) = (1− γ)pˆEH = (1− γ)(∆− t). (63)
Since ΠEL(pˆI L, pˆEL, 0) = ΠEL(t, t, 0) = t/2, the inequality in (31) is equivalent to γ ≥ (2∆−
3t)/(2∆− 2t). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Statements (a) and (b) follow immediately from Lemmas 3, 4 and
5. Q.E.D.
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